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TDRALTAXATI ON
The federal income tax generally
applies to "all income from whatever
source derived." 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)
(1988). However, Section 104(a)(2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 provides that income does not
include "the amount of any damages
received (whether by suit or agree-
ment.. .) on account of personal
injuries or sickness." 26 U.S.C. §
104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The applicable Treasury Regulation
provides: "The term 'damages
received (whether by suit or agree-
ment)' means an amount received...
through prosecution of a legal suit
or action based upon tort or tort
type rights, or through a settlement
agreement entered into in lieu of
such prosecution." 26 C.F.R. §
1.104-1(c) (1994). A tort is a private
or civil wrong, other than breach of
contract, for which courts award
damages. This case will determine
whether or not claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (the "ADEA" or the
"Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988
& Supp. V 1993), vindicate tort or
tort-type rights for purposes of
federal income taxation.
The ADEA prohibits employers from
"discharg[ing] any individual...
because of such individual's age."
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988). The
remedies for an unlawful discharge
under the ADEA include reinstate-
ment, back pay, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and attorneys'
fees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), 216(b) &
217 (1988). In the case of a willful
violation of the ADEA, the Act also
authorizes an additional award of
liquidated damages in an amount
equal to the back pay award. 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
ISSUE
Are monies received as back pay and
liquidated damages in settlement of
an ADEA claim excluded from federal
income taxation because they qualify
as damages received on account of
personal injuries or sickness?
FACTS
This case concerns the 1986 federal
income tax liability of Erich E. and
Helen B. Schleier. Until 1979, Erich
Schleier spent 20 years as a pilot for
United Airlines, Inc. ("United").
During an earlier 20-year military
career, the retired Air Force colonel
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The Internal Revenue
Code excludes damages
received "on account of
personal injuries" from
federal income taxation.
In this case, the Supreme
Court decides if back pay
and damages received
under the Age
Discrimination in
Employment Act qualify
for this exclusion. The
Court's decision could
affect thousands of work-
ers who have brought, or
may bring, federal age
discrimination claims
after losing their jobs in
downsizings. It may also
resolve the tax status of
punitive damages.
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Case
Glance
flew bombers in World War II and
served as a member of the special
unit that flew President Dwight D.
Eisenhower.
Pursuant to company policy, United
forced Schleier to retire when he
turned 60 years of age. Schleier and
others affected by the policy filed
lawsuits alleging that their firings vio-
lated the ADEA. In 1986, after sever-
al years of litigation, United agreed to
settle claims of intentional age dis-
crimination. United paid Schleier
$72,814.50 in back pay and an equal
amount in liquidated damages.
The Schleiers reported the back pay
as income on their 1986 federal
income tax return, but they did not
report the liquidated damages. Upon
audit, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (the "Commissioner")
issued a statutory notice of deficien-
cy for failure to pay taxes on the
liquidated damages and asked for
payment of $35,918.50 in additional
federal income taxes.
The Schleiers filed a petition in the
Tax Court contesting the notice of
deficiency. They also sought a deter-
mination that they overpaid their
federal income taxes for 1986, claim-
ing that the back pay portion of their
settlement with United was not sub-
ject to tax under Section 104(a)(2).
In an unreported order, the Tax Court
ruled that both the back pay and the
liquidated damages qualified for
exclusion under Section 104(a)(2).
Pursuant to the order, the Tax Court
issued a decision determining that
the Schleiers had overpaid their
income taxes for 1986 by $31,495.
1993 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 93.
The Commissioner appealed to the
Fifth Circuit and filed a suggestion
that the court of appeals hear the
case en banc (i.e., that all active
judges in the circuit would hear the
appeal). The Commissioner's
en banc request was denied and, in
an unpublished opinion, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the decision of
the Tax Court. In so holding, the
court followed the Circuit's earlier
decision in Purcell v. Seguin State
Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950
(5th Cir. 1993), which concluded
that Section 104(a)(2) excluded
amounts recovered under the ADEA
from the federal income tax. On
November 14, 1994, the Supreme
Court granted the Commissioner's
petition for a writ of certiorari to
review the Fifth Circuit's decision.
115 S. Ct. 507 (1994).
CASE ANALYSIS
Congress enacted the exclusion for
damages received on account of
personal injuries or sickness as
part of the Revenue Act of 1918,
40 Stat. 1057, 1065-66 (1919). For
more than 75 years, Congress has
retained the exclusion in every codi-
fication of the tax law with essential-
ly no change in the relevant statuto-
ry language. Interestingly, however,
Congress has never defined the term
personal injuries, and the provi-
sion's legislative history does not
define or explain the term. As men-
tioned above, since 1960, a Treasury
Regulation has interpreted the pro-
vision to apply to monies received
in settlement of lawsuits involving
tort or tort-type rights. Treas. Reg. §
1.104-1(c). Beginning in the 1980s,
courts started accepting arguments
that Section 104(a)(2) could apply
to monies received by complainants
in employment discrimination cases.
About three years ago, in United
States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867
(1992), the Supreme Court consid-
ered a case involving the exclusion
of Section 104(a)(2). The Court held
that the back pay awards received in
settlement of sex discrimination
claims brought under the pre-1991
version of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V
1993), did not qualify for the exclu-
sion from income under Section
104(a)(2). The Court, however, did
not discuss the applicability of its
ruling to ADEA cases since Burke
involved sex discrimination under
the pre-1991 version of Title VII,
rather than age discrimination.
After the Burke decision, various
federal courts have reached conflict-
ing conclusions regarding the taxa-
tion of ADEA awards. The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, as well as the Tax
Court, the Court of Federal Claims,
and several federal district courts
have concluded that ADEA damages
do not give rise to taxable income
under Section 104(a)(2). See, e.g.,
Purcell, 999 F.2d at 950; Schmitz v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th
Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed,
No. 94-944; Downey v. Commissioner,
97 T.C. 150 (1991), supp. op., 100
T.C. 634 (1993) (but note subse-
quent case history set forth below);
Bennett v. United States, 30 Fed.
Cl. 396 (1994), appealfiled,
No. 94-5107 (Fed. Cir.); Rice v.
United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241
(E.D. Cal. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 571
(9th Cir. 1994), petition for cert.
filed, No. 94-944; Klein v. Secretary
of Transportation, 807 F. Supp.
1517 (E.D. Wash. 1992). In addition,
before Burke was decided, the Third
and Sixth Circuits concluded that
taxpayers could exclude ADEA dam-
ages under Section 104(a)(2). Rickel
v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d
Cir. 1990); Pistillo v. Commissioner,
912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
The Seventh Circuit and several
other district courts, however, have
reached contrary conclusions after
Burke. Downey v. Commissioner, 33
F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), petition for
cert. filed, No. 94-999; Maleszewski
v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553
(N.D. Fla. 1993); Shaw v. United
States, 853 F. Supp. 1378 (M.D. Ala.
1994); Drase v. United States, 866 F.
Supp. 1077 (N.D. I11. 1994). This
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case is expected to resolve the
conflict.
The Commissioner contests the
lower courts' rulings which refused
to tax either back pay or liquidated
damages. The Commissioner argues
that the interpretation of Section
104(a)(2) which the Supreme Court
adopted in Burke applies to ADEA
awards or settlements.
In the Commissioner's view, Section
104(a)(2) applies only when the
underlying cause of action which led
to the taxpayer's recovery provides
compensation for the personal, not
just the economic, components of
the taxpayer's injury. Based on
Burke, the Commissioner contends
that a cause of action that does not
compensate for the traditional
harms associated with personal
injury, e.g., pain and suffering, emo-
tional distress, or harm to reputa-
tion, does not produce damages on
account of personal injuries within
the language of Section 104(a)(2).
The Commissioner agrees that age
discrimination can cause personal
injury but argues that the ADEA's
remedial scheme, like the remedial
scheme of the pre-1991 Title VII,
focuses on the employee's economic
loss, rather than the employee's per-
sonal injury. The Commissioner rea-
sons that because neither back pay
nor liquidated damages compensate
a victim for the traditional personal
harms associated with personal
injury, the recovery of these monies
does not fall within the tax exclusion
of Section 104(a)(2).
The Commissioner also contends
that liquidated damages do not quali-
fy for the exclusion from income for
two reasons. First, the Commissioner
observes that the ADEA awards liqui-
dated damages for willful Aiscrimina-
tion only when the.ernployee has suf-
fered economic loss. If an employee
obtains only declaratory or equitable
relief and does not recover back pay
or if the employer did not willfully
violate the ADEA, the Act does not
authorize liquidated damages even
though the employee has suffered a
personal injury, broadly construed.
Furthermore, when liquidated dam-
ages are paid, those damages bear no
relationship to the personal injury
that the victim has endured. In the
Commissioner's view, therefore, liq-
uidated damages do not provide
compensation for the personal ele-
ments of the employee's injury;
rather, liquidated damages serve as
an enforcement mechanism to deter
willful violations of the ADEA.
Second, the Commissioner main-
tains that liquidated damages do not
qualify for the exclusion because the
ADEA awards such amounts "on
account of" the employer's willful
misconduct, not "on account of per-
sonal injuries." The Commissioner
argues, therefore, that liquidated
damages punish employers for illegal
conduct and deter similar conduct;
they do not compensate employees
for personal injuries. Under the
Commissioner's interpretation, the
plain language of the statute simply
does not encompass liquidated
damages.
In response, the Schleiers also rely
on the literal language in Section
104(a)(2). They begin by arguing
that the statute excludes "any
damages received ... on account of
personal injuries" from income.
(Emphasis added.) The Schleiers
argue that Mr. Schleier suffered a
personal injury when he became the
victim of age discrimination.
The Schleiers assert that the Burke
Court cited with approval Rickel,
900 F.2d at 655, the first decision to
hold that Section 104(a)(2) autho-
rizes the exclusion of back pay
awards under the ADEA from
income for purposes of the federal
income tax. Based on Burke, the
Schleiers contend that broad reme-
American Bar Association
dial schemes such as the ADEA
that provide for jury trials and
damages beyond lost wages give
rise to excludable personal injury
damages. The Schleiers observe
that the ADEA incorporates both of
these elements, whose absence led
the Burke Court to conclude that
damages paid to victims of sex dis-
crimination under the pre-1991
version of Title VII were taxable. In
their view, liquidated damages
under the ADEA compensate for
injuries that flow from the discrimi-
nation but that are difficult to
prove and measure, thereby offer-
ing the range of damages that
Burke requires. In addition, they
reason that the Commissioner's
argument that ADEA liquidated
damages punish wrongdoers high-
lights an additional tort-type right
that the ADEA provides.
The Schleiers contend that the pol-
icy underlying Section 104(a)(2)
justifies excluding ADEA damages
from income. They emphasize the
role of compassion as the justifica-
tion for the exclusion. In the
Schleiers' view, excluding ADEA
damages from a victim's income
comports with Section 104(a)(2)'s
policy to extend legislative compas-
sion to victims of tort-type injuries
and realizes the ADEA's humanitar-
ian objectives. The Schleiers argue
that no rational policy justifies
denying victims who seek relief for
age discrimination under the ADEA
the same compassionate treatment
which Section 104(a)(2) accords
victims proceeding under other fed-
eral anti-discrimination statutes or
under tort law generally.
Finally, the Schleiers argue that
ADEA liquidated damages serve a
partially compensatory role,
reflecting their origins in the com-
pensatory liquidated damages of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). They, therefore, dis-
(Continued on Page 282)
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tinguish ADEA liquidated damages
from those damages that merely
punish a wrongdoer. The Schleiers
contend that because ADEA liquidat-
ed damages compensate victims for
consequential damages flowing from
discrimination, those liquidated
damages are received and qualify as
on account of personal injuries with-
in the meaning of Section 104(a)(2).
They observe that the ADEA does
not authorize liquidated damages
unless the victim can show an enti-
tlement to back pay. In addition, the
amount of back pay determines the
amount of liquidated damages.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Court's decision may affect
thousands of employees who have
lost their jobs, or who will lose their
jobs, in corporate downsizings and
restructurings. Employees who lose
their jobs after reaching the age of
40 often bring ADEA claims or
accept early retirement buy outs or
severance payments that may quali-
fy as settlements of potential ADEA
claims.
The nation's aging work force and
the continuing trends in corporate
downsizing and restructuring suggest
that these claims likely will increase
in the future. The Court's decision
should resolve the federal tax status
of damage awards or settlements
under the ADEA for these workers.
If the Court characterizes ADEA liq-
uidated damages as exclusively puni-
tive, the Court may also resolve a
question regarding the federal tax
status of punitive damages, particu-
larly those received before July 11,
1989 with respect to nonphysical
injuries. (As a result of the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-239, Tit. VII, § 7641(a), 103
Stat. 2301, 2379, the tax exclusion
of Section 104(a)(2) does not apply
to punitive damages received in
cases "not involving physical injury
or physical sickness.")
The Commissioner, however, takes
the position that taxpayers must
treat all punitive damages as
income. Again, the lower federal
courts disagree. Compare Hawkins
v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that punitive
damages do not qualify for tax exclu-
sion under Section 104(a)(2)), peti-
tion for cert. filed, No. 94-1041;
Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (same holding); and
Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d
586 (4th Cir. 1990) (same holding),
with Horton v. Commissioner, 33
F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994) (excluding
punitive damages from income).
ARGUMENTS
For the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (Counsel of Record: Drew
S. Days, III, Solicitor General;
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC 20530; (202) 514-2217):
1. Section 104(a)(2) authorizes an
exclusion from income only for dam-
ages received on account of personal
injury or sickness.
2. Back pay and liquidated damages
awarded under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act do not represent
damages received on account of
personal injury.
3. Liquidated damages under the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act do not qualify for the exclusion
under Section 104(a)(2) for the
additional reason that these
amounts represent awards "on
account of" the defendant's willful
misconduct rather than "on account
of" the taxpayer's personal injury.
For Erich E. and Helen B. Schleier
(Counsel of Record: Thomas F.
Joyce; Bell, Boyd & Lloyd; 70 West
Madison Street, Suite 3200, Chicago,
IL 60602; (312) 372-1121):
1. The Schleiers can exclude the age
discrimination damages from their
gross income because they received
the damages on account of personal
injury in a suit involving tort or tort-
type rights.
2. The Commissioner's litigating pos-
ture is wrong as a matter of law and
fails as policy.
3. Liquidated damages under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
are not includable in income as
punitive damages under Section
104(a)(2).
AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of Erich E. and Helen B.
Schleier
Joint brief of the American
Association of Retired Persons and
the National Employment Lawyers
Association (Counsel of Record:
Cathy Ventrell-Monsees; American
Association of Retired Persons; 601
E Street, NW, Washington, DC
20049; (202) 434-2060);
The Equal Employment Advisory
Council (Counsel of Record:
Kimberly L. Japinga; McGuiness &
Williams; 1015 15th Street, NW,
Suite 1200, Washington, DC 2005;
(202) 789-8600);
The Migrant Legal Action
Program, Inc. (Counsel of Record:
Collette C. Goodman; Shea &
Gardner; 1800 Massachusetts
Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036;
(202) 828-2000);
The Pan Am Pilots Tax Group
(Counsel of Record: Sanford Jay
Rosen; Rosen, Bien & Asaro;
155 Montgomery Street, 8th Floor,
San Francisco, CA 94104;
(415) 433-6830).
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